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 Using banking and economic data from 2000 to 2010 for all 50 US states, 
this paper tests the hypothesis that commercial bank branching and commercial 
bank deposits both positively impact state economic growth. The results support 
this hypothesis, and suggest that the branching-growth nexus remains persistent 
even in the face of nationwide recessions and bank failures. 
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I. Introduction 
The gradual deregulation of banking in the United States during the last quarter 
of the 20th century has enabled measurement of commercial bank deposits as an 
incubator of state economic growth. The “Great Recession” that occurred in the 
United States between 2007 and 2010 further allows economists to test the 
strength of the most visible result of banking deregulation – the widespread 
proliferation of bank branching – in terms of its effect on state GDP. 
If the economic effects of commercial bank branching and commercial deposit 
depth could be isolated and calculated, an array of state-level financial 
development questions could be answered, such as: 
1.) Can we forecast the impact of commercial bank branches on state GDP, 
relative to the impact of unit banks? 
2.) What effect, if any, might bank deposits and/or bank branching have in 
offsetting the effects of unemployment during a recession? 
3.) Does the convenience of commercial bank branching provide an 
intrinsically positive influence on fund supply? 
4.) Does the depth of bank deposits and/or bank branching positively affect 
state GDP notwithstanding the economic effect of bank failures? 
This study attempts to identify influences of commercial bank deposits and 
commercial bank branching on state economic indicators in a manner that might 
address the concerns listed above. This paper will first provide the reader with 
background information necessary to interpret the findings, followed by a review 
of selected literature, a description of data, an outline of the methodology, a  
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detailed report of the results, and finally, a conclusion summarizing the overall 
findings and implications of the study. 
II. Background 
Between 1970 and 1996, state and national regulations that restricted bank 
branching and interstate banking were gradually relaxed, resulting in all 50 states 
allowing at least some form of freedom in bank branching before the turn of the 
century (Strahan 2003). Most notable among these deregulations was the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which allowed 
banks to open branches across state lines effective June 1997.1 Both state and 
national deregulations activated a trend of banking-industry consolidation, 
manifest through a constant succession of mergers and acquisitions (Wheelock 
2011). The state-level deregulations enabled highly efficient banks to accumulate 
a larger market presence by expanding their branch networks – often at the 
expense of smaller and/or less efficient banks (Jayaratne & Strahan 1996). 
Because efficiency was the presumed driver of a bank’s survival in post-
deregulation environments, quality of banks’ loan portfolios improved during 
this consolidation period, and as a result, the collective performance of banks 
that survived state deregulation created a positive impact on economic growth 
(Jayaratne & Strahan 1996).  
                                                          
1 http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/50 
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Interstate banking deregulation further enhanced the durability of banks that 
expanded their branch networks across state lines. Banks able to open new 
interstate branches benefited from reduced profit-based bank risks – especially 
where banks established branches within an economically diverse region (Shiers 
2002). Thus, the overall result of deregulation was that highly efficient banks 
were able to increase their size and reduce their risks, making them more likely to 
outlast smaller, less efficient and less asset-diversified banks. 
In conjunction with deregulation, improvements in information and 
telecommunications technology also contributed to the consolidation of the 
banking industry. Proliferation of electronic-payment systems, back-office IT 
systems and credit-scoring technologies during the 1990s greatly increased 
banking efficiency, and enabled long-distance loans (Berger 2003). In addition, 
automated teller machines (ATMs) and debit cards enjoyed significant market 
penetration during the 1990s and the 2000 decade, which elevated the role of 
banks as a payment system for customers (Gerdes, Walton, Liu & Parke 2005). 
These technologies usually benefited larger banks earlier than smaller banks 
(presumably due to cost constraints faced by smaller banks), granting yet another 
tangible advantage to larger, more efficient and more geographically-dispersed 
banking institutions (Berger 2003). 
This banking-consolidation trend continued into the financial crisis of 2007-
2010, wherein bank concentration increased simultaneously with an increase of 
bank failures. Of 318 bank failures that occurred between 2007 and 2010, about 
94 percent were acquired through “purchase and assumption” (P&A) transactions 
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by another institution – the acquiring institution typically was a larger bank with 
more branches than the failed banks (Wheelock 2011).  Most failed banks during 
this period were small, but there were large banks that failed as well – the most 
notable among these was Washington Mutual Bank, which was declared 
insolvent in 2008, and acquired by JP Morgan Chase (Wheelock 2010). Other 
large commercial banks, such as Countrywide Bank, Wachovia Bank and 
National City Bank, were acquired by other banks during the financial crisis, but 
were never officially declared “failed banks” or closed by regulators (Wheelock 
2011). As of 2014, the nation’s largest commercial banks controlled trillions of 
dollars of deposits, and owned thousands of offices across America.2 The top four 
banks alone had about $3.58 trillion in deposits in 2014, comprising roughly 21 
percent of US GDP that year.  
In summary, the recent history of banking, leading up to and beyond the financial 
crisis, has been a story of constant consolidation, in which the commercial 
banking industry collectively sought to enhance performance by increasing 
efficiency, improving technology, increasing merger-and-acquisition activity and 
expanding branch penetration. As the US banking industry increases its depth 
and improves its performance, economists theorize that economic factors will 
improve as well, as shown by the literature review in the upcoming section. 
 
 
                                                          
2 https://www2.fdic.gov/sod/sodSumReport.asp?barItem=3&sInfoAsOf=2014) 
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III. Review of Selected Literature 
Mainstream economic literature has depicted a perpetual two-way causality 
between banking and economic growth. Specifically, existing literature describes 
a pattern in which trade activity increases the depth of financial-market activity, 
enabling investment in capital-intensive industrial projects, which ultimately 
results in rapid economic growth. Historical studies establish banking as an 
essential tool in the initial upward mobility of the world’s most developed 
economies. Joseph Schumpeter (1911) established the concept of banking as the 
necessary condition for entrepreneurship, stating that virtually every 
entrepreneur is first a “debtor.” Alfred Marshall (1923) wrote that this 
entrepreneurship condition evolved from a merchant-manufacturer relationship, 
wherein the manufacturer initially borrowed from a merchant, who hired him to 
make products, from which the merchant profited upon selling. As the business 
of manufacturing became more ambitious, manufacturers began borrowing from 
banks, enabled by pooled deposits from the public (Marshall 1923).  
Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) describes banking as a useful device for 
economies tasked with “catching-up” to the modern world. Gerschenkron 
depicted banks as the determining factor in the development of French and 
German economies during the nineteenth century, wherein banks mobilized 
credit to fund large-scale heavy industry ventures. He further mentions that the 
absence of a strong banking sector, often due to scarce financial capital, renders a 
backward economy unable to fund the types of capital-intensive projects 
necessary for economic modernization. Edward Shaw (1973) proposed that large-
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scale investment is made possible in the private sector when savings are pooled in 
financial markets. Shaw recognized the streamlining effect that banking 
efficiency has on the overall efficiency of an economy at large, stating that the 
integration of capital markets causes the integration of labor, land and product 
markets – creating more benefits from economies of scale and comparative 
advantage in production. The dual causality of financial deepening and economic 
growth was explained by Jeremy Greenwood and Bryan Jovanovic (1990), whose 
extensive mathematical models showed that economic growth develops financial 
structure, and consequently, financial structure enables higher growth. The most 
notable conclusion of their research is that growth is usually slower when 
exchange is unorganized – suggesting that robust banking systems provide the 
most efficient investment opportunities within economies that are already robust. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic specifically cited factors within a strong banking 
system that directly affect economic growth. These factors include the pooling of 
risk and the gathering of financial information – the latter allowing resources to 
flow toward their most effective use, enabling the most profitable results of an 
investment project. 
Hidden within the literature is the constraint of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, 
which states, among other things, that a firm’s value remains the same regardless 
of whether its funding structure consists of bank loans or stock sales (Modigliani 
& Miller 1958). This theorem has prompted economists to distinguish between 
bank-oriented economies, such as Japan and Germany, where banks play a much 
more integrated role in economic development, and market-oriented systems, 
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such as the United Kingdom and the United States, in which financial markets 
(stock sales) play a stronger role (Levine 2002). Colin Mayer (1991) describes the 
bank-oriented growth model as a “hands-on” endeavor, where banks form long-
term committed relationships with entrepreneurs, which reduces moral hazard 
and time-inconsistency problems. In their comprehensive study of European 
industrial history, Rondo Cameron and Richard Tilly (1967) reinforce the concept 
of banking as a catalyst for economic growth (Cameron et. al. 1967). Cameron 
states that banking made a “positive and significant contribution” to England’s 
Industrial Revolution – often despite poor and inefficient economic decisions 
made by England’s government and central bank. Cameron cites country-banking 
instruments, such as checks, shop notes and trade bills, as major catalysts of the 
financial deepening that enabled the rapid and far-reaching proliferation of 
England’s industrial growth. Cameron also credits Scotland’s robust banking 
system as a determining factor in Scotland’s success in “catching up” to England’s 
per-capita income levels during the nineteenth century. Tilly reinforces the image 
of the banking-intensive German economy, stating that private German banks 
were needed to flow funds into industries where capital was scarce. Tilly stated 
that German banks formed long-term relationships with entrepreneurial firms, 
which ultimately converted short-term credit into long-term credit.  
An alternative theory of finance and economic development was initiated by Joan 
Robinson (1952), who introduced the concept of fund supply as a measure of 
“confidence” on the part of those who own financial wealth. Her now-infamous 
quote, “where enterprise leads, finance follows,” appears to express the belief that 
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enterprise creates prospects for financiers to supply funds in expectation of 
future profit. From the same passage (from chapter 4.II of her 1952 book, The 
Generalization of the General Theory), she expresses the importance of 
economic confidence as it relates to finance and industry, in which she states, “A 
high level of prospective profits and a high degree of confidence in these 
prospects promote enterprise and at the same time ease the supply of finance.” 
This quote is most important, because it eschews the current concept of dual 
causality between finance and economic activity in favor of a more sequentially-
logical model – it is economic confidence that causes both enterprise activity and 
finance simultaneously. This aspect of Robinson’s philosophy, as it relates to 
some of the models in my research study, will be described in further detail 
toward the end of this section. 
Within American development history, Homer Hoyt (1941) and Douglass North 
(1956) credit banks and financial institutions with strengthening America’s urban 
economic base, allowing American cities to grow rapidly. Hoyt cited banking and 
insurance as fundamental sources of workforce employment, and North stated 
that external investment capital tends to flow into existing export industries, 
which North believed were essential toward creating local employment that 
causes cities to grow. 
Within the subject of banking and its effect on development, newer literature has 
revealed specific factors that positively impact economic growth. Levine, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Cihak (2013) created a useful global database using 
four measures to assess a nation’s financial development: 1.) Size/depth; 2.) 
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Access; 3.) Efficiency and 4.) Stability. They then compared correlations between 
the four financial-development factors and the economic development levels of 
various nations. According to Levine et al., financial development describes the 
extent to which financial factors reduce the effects of imperfect markets, mostly 
by drafting enforceable contracts, reducing transaction costs and employing 
information technology. Levine et al. further propose that when financial 
institutions succeed at mitigating the effects of imperfect markets, they enable 
allocation of resources toward the most promising ideas and projects, and 
thereby, yield economic development. Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Leora Klapper 
(2012) discovered a link between bank-account access and the income levels of 
nations. They found that bank account penetration is considerably less in low 
income countries, where a small minority of people (24 percent) have formal 
bank accounts, compared to a greater majority of people (89 percent) who have 
bank accounts in high-income countries. With regard to banking deregulation, 
Zou, Miller and Malamud (2009) discovered that banks enjoyed higher returns 
on equity and higher returns on assets following the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (mentioned in the background 
section), but efficiency gains differed between various income classes of banks. 
With regard to smaller community banks, Emmons, Gilbert and Yeager (2004) 
delineated two types of risks faced by small banks: 1.) Risks associated with non-
diversified clients (idiosyncratic risk), and 2.) Risks associated with the absence 
of bank branches (market risk). This implies that bank branching increases an 
institution’s chances of survival. Although this view is generally supported by US 
banking history, Craig Aubuchon and David Wheelock’s 2010 study of the 
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banking industry recession revealed exceptions to this rule – as mentioned in the 
previous section, several large banking institutions with sizable branch networks 
still failed during the 2007-2010 recession. Because the 2007-2010 banking 
recession represents an anomaly, this study generally assumes that larger and 
more diversified banks enjoy greater security, at least in the face of local 
economic downturns.  
Existing literature measures banking factors using a variety of methods. With 
regard to banking intensity, Raymond Goldsmith (1969) tracked the assets-to-
GNP ratio; Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale (1994) tracked the ratio of assets 
divided by GDP and Ronald McKinnon (1973) measured banking intensity by the 
ratio of banking liabilities (presumably deposits) divided by GNP. More recently, 
Levine, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Cihak (2013) used a statistic called “private 
credit to GDP” ratio, which involves domestic private credit to the “real sector,” 
and excludes credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Levine et al. 
reported that this statistic is positively correlated with the income levels of 
nations. 
Other economists track banking strength by size. Robert King and Ross Levine 
(1993) used the size of the financial sector relative to GDP as a measure of 
financial development. Grabowski, Aly, Pasurka and Rangan (1990) estimated 
the effect of bank size on technical efficiency, in which they measured a bank’s 
size by total deposits and the number of branches. With respect to other 
indicators, Michael Klein (1971) believed the convenience of banking locations 
was a strong inducement for depositors, stating “…since demand deposits are 
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used primarily for transactions, the proximity of the depositor to the bank is of 
prime importance.”  
In contrast to the existing literature, my study uses a wider assortment of 
intensity and strength variables to gauge relationships between banking and state 
GDP. Where King & Levine (1993), and Levine et.al (2013) measure banking 
strength in terms of assets, my study measures commercial bank deposits in 
terms of their dual nature. On a balance sheet, deposits represent a proxy for 
Joan Robinson’s measure of economic confidence within a region. Deposits are 
sourced on two general fronts – they are simultaneously fueled by fund supply on 
the right-hand side of a bank’s balance sheet (deposits as liabilities), and 
commercial lending generated by the left-hand side, which creates “new private 
saving” in the form of deposits made by eventual borrowers (Tobin 1963). From a 
competitive-market standpoint, deposits may be similar to an employment rate – 
my findings suggest they are the mechanism by which financial-industry 
expansion and streamlining can be inferred. My study also attempts a specific 
path with regard to branch banking. Whereas Benston et al. (1982) and Powers 
(1969) successfully measured the economy-of-scale and/or efficiency capabilities 
between branches and unit banks, my study tracks the ability of branching weight 
and banking consolidation to positively impact state GDP while withstanding 
economic shocks associated with recessions and bank failures. This is feasible 
because of two important banking events that occurred during the time-interval 
of my study: 1.) In 2003, electronic payments outnumbered the usage of checks 
for the first time in American history – indicating the ability of technology (which 
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primarily favors larger banks) to vastly improve the efficiency of the “payment 
system” function of the finance industry (Gerdes et.al 2005); and 2.) The 
financial crisis of 2007-2010 caused a massive wave of bank failures – many of 
which were resolved by acquisitions transactions (Wheelock 2010).  For these 
reasons, I am able to test the effects of consolidation (fueled by deregulation, 
technology and bank failures) and bank deposits (a partial proxy for Joan 
Robinson’s concept of economic confidence) against the effects of cyclical 
economic downturns (visible during the financial crisis of 2007-2010). 
IV. Data 
This section describes and defines the banking and financial data used in this 
study, and specifies general trends observed within the data. My study uses 
financial and sector-industry data within a cross-section of all 50 states in the 
United States of America (not including the District of Columbia), across a time-
interval spanning 2000 to 2010. My goal was to obtain data that would allow 
calculation of: 1.) Banking factor elasticities of state GDP, 2.) Weights of banking 
activity, and 3.) Banking factor elasticities of income pertaining to state 
industries – most notably, construction, trade and financial services. Banking 
data were obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) 
Historical Statistics on Banking database.3 These data include total commercial 
bank deposits (foreign and domestic), total number of banking institutions, 
number of banks with branches, number of unit banks (stand-alone banks that 
                                                          
3 https://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=10&Header=1 
 
13 
 
 
 
do not operate branches), total number of branches and total number of bank 
offices. The “total number of banking institutions” statistic is recorded by the 
FDIC as the sum of the “number of unit banks” statistic plus the “number of 
banks with branches” figure. The “total number of bank offices” statistic is 
recorded by the FDIC as the sum of the “total number of banking institutions” 
figure plus the “total number of branches” statistic. This means unit banks can be 
weighted both as a percentage of banking institutions and as a percentage of 
bank offices, while bank branches only can be weighted as a percentage of bank 
offices. Descriptive statistics of these variables are visible in Table A1. 
 
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
State GDP Log 550 25.7188 1.0513 23.5754 28.3214
Manufacturing Log 550 23.5713 1.2883 20.5405 26.2366
Manufacturing Share of GDP 550 0.1309 0.0563 0.0190 0.2983
Transportation Log 550 22.2161 1.0450 19.7919 24.5320
Financial Svcs Log 550 22.9186 1.2214 20.2596 26.0060
Financial Svcs Share of GDP 550 0.0693 0.0450 0.0192 0.3164
Unemployment Rate 550 5.5319 1.9834 2.3000 13.7833
Deposits Log 550 24.5513 1.3891 21.3241 28.0663
Deposits Relative to State GDP 550 0.7254 1.8091 0.0167 23.9535
Banks Log 550 4.4504 1.1917 1.3863 6.5667
Branches Log 550 6.8570 0.9985 4.7536 8.8406
Branches Per 100,000 residents 550 27.1910 7.6744 12.3982 49.5765
Offices Log 550 6.9687 0.9899 4.8040 8.8811
Branches Per Offices 550 0.8976 0.0739 0.6667 0.9747
Unit Banks Per Offices 550 0.0297 0.0339 0.0000 0.1920
Deposits Per Office Log 550 17.5826 1.0826 15.5190 21.4531
Deposits Per Capita Log 550 9.4436 1.0901 6.7089 13.9457
Unit Banks Log 550 2.8999 1.3929 0.0000 5.5013
Unit Banks Per 100,000 Residents 550 1.1205 1.5867 0.0000 9.2775
Banks with Branches 550 109.5964 101.8266 4.0000 470.0000
Banks With Branches Log 550 4.1613 1.1777 1.3863 6.1527
Total Banks 550 149.3109 146.8852 4.0000 711.0000
Population Log 550 15.1077 1.0112 13.1109 17.4333
National Fed Funds Rate 550 2.7036 1.9883 0.1600 6.2400
Failed Banks 550 0.5327 2.3161 0.0000 24.0000
Farm GDP Log 550 20.7673 1.3373 16.3004 23.8052
Oil & Gas Extraction Log 550 14.6104 8.0469 0.0000 25.7589
Mining Log 550 19.7618 2.0761 0.0000 22.7900
Construction Log 550 22.6567 1.0293 20.5713 25.2732
Wholesale Trade Log 550 22.8060 1.1556 20.3975 25.4259
Retail Trade Log 550 23.0047 1.0135 20.9384 25.5413
Total Trade Log 550 23.6107 1.0715 21.4164 26.1627
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics
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Per Table A1, the logs of the economic sector indicators mostly show substantial 
but comparable numerical ranges, and the bank statistics show a relatively wide 
range. The logs of the total number of banking institutions ranged from 1.3863 to 
6.5667. When coupled with a mean of 4.4504, this range indicates that the 
number of overall banking institutions varied greatly across states as well as time. 
Also remarkable is the range of the “bank branches per total bank offices” 
statistic – it ranged from 0.6667 to 0.9747, with a mean of 0.8976 and a standard 
deviation of 0.0739. This relatively high mean suggests banks across the United 
States generally followed a trend of increasing the overall number of bank 
branches per state per year (presumably to make bank branches “convenient” to 
attract lenders’ deposits, and possibly, to attract customers to purchase loans). 
The “unit banking per 100,000 residents” statistic shows the opposite trend, the 
range extends from zero (0) to 9.2775, but the mean is low – it’s 1.1205, with a 
small standard deviation of 1.5867 – indicating a national trend toward reducing 
the population of unit banks per state per year. 
Industry data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) 
Interactive Data Application website.4 These data include state GDP, state 
financial and insurance services GDP and state manufacturing GDP. I also 
obtained state industry GDP data for farming, transportation, mining, oil & gas 
extraction, trade (wholesale and retail) and construction from this same 
database. I obtained state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor 
                                                          
4http://www.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=1#reqid=70&step=5&isuri=1&7003
=200&7004=naics&7001=1200&7002=1&7090=70 
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Statistics (BLS) database.5 Elsewhere, the federal funds rate was obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors website database;6 ten-year inclusive 
state population data were garnered from the United States Census 2012 
Intercensal Estimates application;7 and failed banks data were obtained from the 
“Failures & Assistance” database on the FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking 
(HSOB) website.8 
The data are organized in panel regression format – the cross section variable is 
the state, and the time variable is the year. By and large, the data show steady 
increases in GDP, with minor downturns in 2009, presumably due to the 
nationwide recession that began in 2007 and created visible industry-income 
losses during 2009. Unemployment took an abrupt jump in most states during 
2009, and several states saw short decreases in bank deposits circa 2009-2010. 
V. Methodology 
The following paragraphs outline the models used in this study, and attempt to 
describe the purposes and expected outcomes of each model. Existing literature 
promotes three concepts: 1.) Robust financial systems are associated with GDP 
growth; 2.) Increased bank branching improves overall banking efficiency, which 
                                                          
5http://www.bls.gov/lau/#tables 
 
6http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
 
7https://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/state/state2010.html 
 
8https://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30&Header=1 
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increases economic growth; and 3.) Larger banks (presumably those with 
multiple branches) tend to survive local economic recessions better than unit 
banks. Existing literature also suggests that failed unit banks tend to merge into 
larger banks, wherein the larger bank converts the unit bank’s subsidiaries into 
branches, which further hedges banking risks. The goal of the models listed below 
is to test the impact of bank deposit magnitude on state GDP, and to test the 
impact upon state GDP of changes in the number of bank branches, unit banks 
and total bank offices. The dependent variable for the first group of models is the 
natural logarithm of state GDP (sgdp), measured in state “i” at year “t.” 
First Group: 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2officesit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit    (1) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit   (2) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dpoit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit    (3) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dpclit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit   (4) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1cpdit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit   (5) 
Regarding the independent variables in the first model, the term “b0” is the 
vertical intercept, “dlit” is the natural log of commercial bank deposits, “officesit” 
is the natural log of the number of total bank offices, “ffit” is the federal funds rate 
and “poplnit” is the natural log of state population. In model (2), I replaced 
“officesit” with two related but mutually-exclusive banking variables: the first, 
“brit,” is the natural log of the number of bank branches, and the second, “ubit,” is 
the natural log of the number of unit banks. I did this to test if “brit,” would turn 
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out positive simultaneously with the “ubit” variable turning out negative (as one 
might predict from the existing literature). In model (3) I re-ran a variant of 
model (2), replacing “dlit” with “dpoit,” which is the natural log of the ratio of 
commercial bank deposits per bank office. I used “dpoit,” to determine if the 
weight of deposits per office (a subtle proxy for deposit concentration) would 
produce a positive elasticity coefficient. I used a similar approach in model (4), 
replacing “dpoit” with “dpclit,” which is the natural log of the ratio of commercial 
bank deposits per capita. This was intended to determine if positive elasticity 
would result from changes in the weight of deposits per population – testing the 
effect upon state GDP of deposit growth relative to population. Intuitively, this 
type of growth would reveal economic confidence, among both depositors and 
investors, toward the economic prospects in a particular state. Model (5) replaces 
the “dpclit,” variable with “cpdit,” which represents commercial bank deposits as a 
percentage of state GDP. This variable is meant to test the weight of deposits in 
context with the state’s overall activity. I used this variable because I wanted to 
determine whether the deposits to state GDP ratio could provide a useful 
benchmark by which a commercial banking sector could be judged. This first 
group of equations was assembled to test the effects of raw banking size and 
deposit factors on state GDP growth, and the federal funds rate and state 
population size were used as control variables. The second group of equations are 
intended to measure the elasticities and causalities of commercial bank 
branching weights pertaining to their effect on state GDP, and against the 
economic effect of bank failures. 
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Second Group: 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bpoit + b3ffit + b4fbit + b5poplnit + uit   (6) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dpclit + b2bpoit + b3ffit + b4fbit + b5poplnit + uit   (7) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2brptit + b3ubptit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit  (8) 
The second group of equations tests the relationship between bank branching 
depth and state GDP. The variable “bpoit” represents commercial bank branches 
as a percentage of total bank offices, “fbit” represents the number of failed banks 
in state “i” during year “t,” “brptit” and “ubptit” represent branches per 100,000 
residents and unit-banks per 100,000 residents respectively. These equations are 
designed test the hypothesis that branch weight yields a persistently positive 
economic result notwithstanding the negative effect of failed banks. 
Third Group: 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit    (9) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bwbit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit    (10) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bwbshareit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit   (11) 
The third group of equations test the effect of deposits on state GDP, against a 
persistent backdrop of bank consolidations that have caused reductions in the 
total number of institutions. These models are designed to test whether bank 
consolidation aids state GDP by streamlining financial services. The expression 
“bit” is the logarithm of the total number of banking institutions in state “i” 
during year “t,” “bwbit” represents the logarithm of the number of banks that 
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have branches (“bwbit” is therefore a subset of “bit”). The expression “bwbshareit” 
represents the weight of this subset relationship – it’s the number of banks with 
branches as a percentage of the total number of banking institutions. 
Fourth Group: 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit    (12) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dpoit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit    (13) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1dpclit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit    (14) 
sgdpit = b0 + b1bwbshareit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit   (15) 
The fourth group of models uses the same variables used in the first group, 
however, the models test the impact of deposit weights on state GDP against a 
backdrop of unemployment – the expression “umpit” refers to the unemployment 
rate in state “i” during year “t.” The last equation of the group (15) specifically 
tracks the impact upon state GDP of the share of banks with branches, 
notwithstanding the effect of the unemployment rate. 
Fifth Group: 
dlit = b0 + b1officesit + b2ffit + b3fspgdpit + uit     (16) 
dlit = b0 + b1brit + b2ffit + b3fspgdpit + uit      (17) 
The fifth group of equations tests the source of the deposits. On its face, this 
might appear to create an endogeneity problem. For this reason, I test the effects 
of the logarithms of offices and branches on the logarithm of deposits, but set 
against the weight of financial services sector GDP (“fspgdpit”). This pairing was 
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meant to isolate the possible causal effect of financial industry robustness on 
commercial deposit magnitude. My hypothesis is that both the office/branch 
variables and the financial sector weight variable will result in positive first-order 
conditions, which means that branch convenience (representing the source of 
funds on the right-hand side of the balance sheet) and financial sector income 
weight (a partial proxy for left-hand side effectiveness relative to state GDP) both 
simultaneously feed the magnitude of commercial deposits.  
Sixth Group: 
fsit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit      (18) 
fsit = b0 + b1brptit + b2ubptit + b3poplnit + uit     (19) 
cnsit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit     (20) 
tradeit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit     (21) 
transit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit     (22) 
The sixth group of equations uses natural logarithms of the following industry 
subsets: financial and insurance services GDP (fsit), construction GDP (cnsit), 
trade GDP (tradeit) and transportation GDP (transit). I used the sector-industry 
GDP expressions as dependent variables, and I used the “branches vs unit banks” 
expressions as independent variables. Equation (18) tests the effects of branch 
banking versus unit banks on financial and insurance services GDP, and equation 
(19) does the same, replacing the branch and unit bank variables with the 
branches per 100,000 residents variable and the unit-banks per 100,000 
residents variable. Equations (20), (21) and (22) test the effects of branch 
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banking and unit banking on construction (cnsit), trade (tradeit) and 
transportation (transit) respectively. Existing literature implies the expectation 
that branch-banking elasticity signs should remain positive throughout, and unit 
banking signs should remain negative. If my hypothesis is correct, it would 
indicate that certain homogeneous industries – or, industries abundant to most 
states regardless of climate, topography and/or natural resource abundance – 
should be positively affected by the proliferation of commercial bank branching. 
For robustness, I calculated R-squared, t-test and Wald test values. I also 
conducted two additional tests, regressing log of state GDP (dependent variable) 
on log of commercial deposits (independent variable) using both one lag and two 
lags of the “dlit” variable. 
VI. Results 
I used random effects panel regression to estimate all coefficients because of two 
factors 1.) The slow-moving nature of the variables, and 2.) The Fed Funds Rate 
variable, which is a national statistic with the same figures for all 50 states. This 
means the “ffit” statistic will be cluster-invariant for each year of the sample. The 
following model results reveal coefficients that support the descriptive statistics 
in Table A1 – unit banks followed a trend of reducing, while branches showed a 
trend of increasing weight, and both statistics were related to increases in state 
GDP on the aggregate.  
The first group of equations produced elasticity estimates that mostly support the 
existing literature on banking factors, and their effects on economic growth. In 
the first group of equations, elasticity coefficients for deposits turned out positive, 
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but less than unit-elastic, in all experiments. When placed in perspective with the 
large size of state GDP (totaling hundreds of billions of dollars in some states), 
this indicates that commercial banking deposits maintained a decently important 
correlation with state GDP. 
Elasticity coefficients for the “branch banking vs. unit banking” effects also 
support existing literature. Table B1 in the Appendix section shows the results of 
regression model (1): The log of deposits was 0.0380766, with a robust standard 
error of 0.0152868. The positive sign of this estimated coefficient suggests that 
sheer deposit size is positively correlated with state GDP levels. The log of total 
bank offices also was positive, and slightly more elastic than the deposits log, 
indicating that convenience for lenders and customers might have a positive 
correlation with state GDP magnitude. 
Branch banking throughout the second through the fifth models showed 
coefficients that were positive and less than unit-elastic, and unit bank 
coefficients remained negative and less than unit-elastic. The model (2) results 
(see Table B2) show the branch banks log coefficient was 0.5418656, and the unit 
banks log coefficient was -0.1379699, suggesting that the population of unit 
banks may be negatively correlated with state GDP, notwithstanding fluctuations 
of the federal funds rate. Model (3) results maintained the similar results (see 
Table B3): The coefficient for the log of deposits per office was 0.0330969, very 
close to the pure deposits coefficient. The bank branches log coefficient was 
0.599838, and the unit banks log coefficient was -0.1363223, also proximal to the 
same levels shown in the model (2) results.  
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Model (4) continues this trend: the coefficient of deposits per capita was 
0.0308956, the branch banking coefficient was 0.5418656, and the unit banking 
coefficient was -0.1379699 (see Table B4). Bearing in mind the economic 
recession that occurred during the last two years of the observation period, the 
results of the first four models suggest that unit banks may indeed have been 
swallowed by larger, more efficient banks since the beginning of the 2000 
decade, causing branches to increase simultaneously with the decrease of unit 
banks. Considering the fact that elasticity coefficients for bank offices also 
remained positive throughout the experiment, the “branch vs unit” results also 
support the assertion that larger banks with visible branching networks may 
indeed have more efficient qualities than unit banks, as they are more convenient 
to a larger array of customers, and the merger activity that occurred during the 
recession may have enabled larger banks to reduce costs by converting unit 
banks’ subsidiaries into branches.  
Model 5 suggests possible importance of the deposits to state GDP ratio. The 
coefficient for this variable was positive, 0.007959, and the coefficients for 
branching banks log and unit banks log were 0.5689024 and -0.1358097 
respectively (See Table B5). From an economic-intuition perspective, the 
“deposits to state GDP” ratio, when converted to a whole number percentage, 
represents the number of dollars people are willing to invest into a state’s 
commercial banking system for every one dollar of existing economic transaction 
activity in that state. When this ratio is positively correlated with state GDP, it 
suggests: 1.) That people are “betting” that the state’s economy will provide some 
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type of return, and 2.) This level of confidence might have a self-perpetuating, 
positive effect on state GDP, similar to the appreciative effect that widespread 
buying can have on the price of a corporate stock. The fact that this value was 
positive notwithstanding the branch-log and unit banking-log coefficients 
suggests that merger and acquisition activity – that is, shuffling of the ratio of 
branches to unit banks – should not affect the economic character and the 
economic influence of the “deposits to state GDP” ratio – especially where this 
shuffling is driven by efficiency motive. Fluctuations in federal funds rate also 
should not affect the properties of these coefficients. In total, these findings 
suggest that efficiency and confidence factors may enable a state’s economy to 
withstand a wave of bank mergers and acquisitions. 
The second group of equations resulted in positive relationships between 
commercial branch weight and state GDP, even despite the negative effect of 
bank failures (see C-series Tables). I find these results remarkable because the 
“bpoit” variable (branches per total number of bank offices), produces the 
strongest coefficient of all banking variables – it exceeds 4.1 in models (6) and 
(7), implying that a bank office population comprised of a growing percentage of 
branches correlates with a slightly faster-growing state GDP. As shown in tables 
A2 and A3 of the descriptive statistics, it is worth noting that the “bpoit” variable 
(branches per total bank offices) produced positive compound annual growth 
rates (CAGR), as well as positive 11-year growth rates, for all fifty states, even in 
states where deposit growth and overall bank-population growth were negative. 
This suggests branch penetration can positively affect economic growth 
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regardless of whether commercial deposits are increasing, or if commercial 
deposits show signs of “streamlining” or “rightsizing” during a wave of bank 
failures and/or industry recessions. This phenomenon could be occurring 
because of FDIC deposit payouts from one or more bank failures. David 
Wheelock and Paul Wilson (1995) stated that bank failures are often associated 
with low capitalization, which indicates poor asset performance. In addition, 
Wheelock (2011) mentioned that a large number of commercial banks that failed 
during the financial crisis were relatively small – operating a median of three 
branches each, and operating in a relatively limited geographic area. This means 
statewide deposit losses may represent “inefficient money” that gained poor 
returns on assets, and eventually caused insolvency. Under this scenario, a small, 
inefficient bank with poor asset performance and limited geographic penetration 
would have a negligible impact on state GDP whether it survives or fails, 
regardless of the size of its deposits. This, however, is conjecture, and further 
empirical research in this area might yield a better understanding of deposit 
streamlining. 
Elasticity coefficients within the third group of equations further exemplify a 
trend toward consolidation – the total number of banks, along with the number 
of banks with branches, both showed a negative relationship toward state GDP, 
notwithstanding the positive relationship between deposits and state GDP. This 
indicates that deposits, by-and-large, did not decrease on the aggregate, despite 
the decrease in overall banking institutions (see D-series tables). This trend fits 
the literature, which theorizes that bank consolidations are the inevitable result 
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of profit-maximizing institutions seeking greater size and efficiency – causing the 
total number of institutions to shrink (including smaller or less efficient banks 
that operate a few branches), as the overall strength and depth of the financial-
services industry increases. 
Within the fourth group (see E-series tables), the deposit variables remained 
positive and less-than unit elastic for models (12) through (14). In model (15), the 
share of banks as a percentage of state GDP, maintained a positive and less-than 
unit elastic coefficient despite the effect of unemployment. Note that 
unemployment rate produces positive coefficients throughout models (12) 
through (15), indicating the economy’s possible efforts to profit via workforce 
streamlining in the face of low consumption during the recession period. 
The fifth group of models revealed positive relationships between commercial 
bank branching and commercial deposits. In addition, the robustness of the 
financial services industry, as measured by the percentage of state GDP 
comprised by financial and insurance services income, showed a positive 
influence on deposits (see F-series tables). These two results represent a 
remarkable finding – they lend support to Klein’s theory (1971) of bank 
branching convenience as a competitive inducement for new customers among 
commercial banks. 
The sixth group of equations reveals positive relationships between commercial 
bank branching and various homogenous industries, including construction, 
financial/insurance services, trade and transportation, with a negative influence 
of unit banking on these same sectors (see G-series Tables). This branching vs 
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unit banking relationship, however, did not hold for the manufacturing, oil & gas, 
mining and farming industries. 
These findings suggest that banking factors have a visible association with the 
construction, transportation, trade and financial industries. This relationship 
may exist for the manufacturing industry, but my study failed to produce 
significant coefficients for manufacturing – presumably due to Schumpeter’s law 
of “creative destruction.” The experiments also failed to produce significant 
overall associations between banking factors and the aggregate incomes of 
natural resource-based industries, such as oil & gas extraction, farming and 
mining. Therefore, these models and results were eliminated from the study.  
Lagged regression tests revealed a small but significant relationship between 
bank deposits and state GDP, where log of state GDP was the dependent variable, 
and log of deposits was independent. In all versions, the one-year lagged 
variables had the strongest coefficients, with positive and inelastic relationships 
with state GDP, (in the one-year lagged model, the coefficient was 0.0871451, and 
in the two-year lagged model, it was 0.0479005 for the first lag and 0.0341647 
for the second lag). For these lagged variable tests, the p-values and F-statistics 
were significant at five (5) percent probability levels. Wald chi-square tests 
confirmed an overall significant fit for all models throughout the experiment. 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper studied the influence of commercial bank deposits and commercial 
bank branching on state GDP. The findings suggest the following: 1.) The 
magnitude of commercial bank deposits generally has a positive relationship with 
28 
 
 
 
state GDP, with a substantial but less than unit-elastic influence. 2.) The 
proliferation of commercial bank branches is also positively correlated with state 
GDP, with a substantial but less than unit-elastic influence. 3.) The percentage of 
commercial bank offices comprised of branches has a positive relationship with 
state GDP, even against a backdrop volatile bank merger-and-acquisition 
activities and/or bank failures. Current trends indicate that proliferation of unit 
banking is negatively related to state GDP. 4.) The number of commercial bank 
branches per capita has a positive influence on the magnitude of commercial 
bank deposits, notwithstanding changes in the federal funds rate. 5.) The 
robustness of a state’s financial services industry, as measured by the percentage 
of state GDP comprised by the state’s financial and insurance sector income, also 
is positively correlated with commercial bank deposit growth. 6.) Commercial 
bank branching depth is positively correlated with the growth of homogenous 
sectors, as measured by construction GDP, trade GDP, transportation GDP and 
financial and insurance services GDP (but not weight). Unit bank depth is 
negatively related with growth in these same sectors. These “branching vs. unit 
bank” relationships do not hold for the manufacturing sector, as well as the oil, 
mining and farming sectors. 
The empirical results imply that commercial bank branching may be an essential 
building block that 1.) Advances and fortifies a state’s financial structure, 2.) 
Creates geographic convenience necessary to create substantial deposit 
magnitude, and 3.) Enables a state’s economy to withstand and/or recover from 
adverse economic shocks – even shocks as drastic and unexpected as the 
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financial crisis of 2007-2010. However, as the literature indicates, there is dual 
causality involved within the relationship between commercial banking and state 
economic growth. From this study, we can loosely theorize that commercial 
banking deposits might represent the metaphorical axis that gauges the 
relationship between commercial branching (a generator of saving and 
investment) and state economic growth. The ratio of commercial bank deposits 
to state GDP, which has a positive correlation with overall state GDP growth, 
suggests that commercial banking agents (on the fund supply and demand sides) 
need to have a certain degree of confidence in a state’s economy to effectuate a 
strong relationship between commerce and state economic growth. As Joan 
Robinson indicates, economic activity must already show a certain level of 
robustness to supply funds (in the form of deposits), and as Joseph Schumpeter 
suggests, this same economic activity must also be robust enough for the banking 
system to further invest in industrial prospects. This confidence-breeds-
confidence relationship suggests a state’s economy may benefit from policies that 
strengthen commercial bank branching penetration, which generates the deposit 
depth necessary to incubate new investment, sectoral-industry profits and overall 
state economic growth. 
This study creates further opportunities for research. The statistics in Tables A2 
and A3 reveal the possibility that bank deposits may indeed follow a “cycle,” 
similar to GDP and employment. It seems logical during a wave of bank failures 
that bank deposit fluctuation is a self-adjusting device that automatically fosters 
financial-industry efficiency during times of adverse economic shocks. This is 
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obvious on its face, considering the money-supply goals of the “quantitative 
easing” program devised by the Federal Reserve Bank during the financial crisis. 
However, in today’s world of increased technology, it seems plausible that 
maximizing the population of banked citizens can further enhance deposit 
strength, which can minimize economic risks and shorten the length of economic 
recessions in future years. 
From a development standpoint, another worthwhile extension could involve 
widening the research time-interval, and testing the overall relationship between 
deposits and rapid-growth industries from the beginning of the American 
industrial-revolution era until today. By now, mainstream economists already 
know capital accumulation is necessary for growth, and that banking is a 
necessary mechanism for investment in capital. What is needed for developing 
nations (and communities) is an in-depth dynamic model that pinpoints the best 
industries to compliment the natural resources of an area, and the level of funds a 
state should invest to manufacture Joan Robinson’s concept of “economic 
confidence.” Once economic confidence penetrates a culture as a self-correcting 
mechanism, as it has in the United States, developing cultures may adapt a 
greater affinity for entrepreneurship. 
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State State GDP Bank Deposits Banks Branches Per Offices Unit Banks Per Offices
Alabama 0.035285252 0.025636018 -0.01354 0.002090866 -0.033838491
Alaska 0.062878412 -0.019319656 -0.03619 0.001408812 0
Arizona 0.037313263 -0.085673549 -0.01292 0.001953562 -0.100520555
Arkansas 0.039688323 0.069746648 -0.03572 0.007323952 -0.110969918
California 0.03292892 0.020863269 -0.01727 0.002719125 -0.019463158
Colorado 0.034230688 0.004937802 -0.04666 0.009763555 -0.095456017
Connecticut 0.030529227 0.194462749 -0.00403 0.0018909 -0.05881203
Delaware 0.02975346 0.188380624 -0.04026 0.006479992 -0.071518516
Florida 0.03691678 0.052488115 -0.01678 0.002113087 -0.098884966
Georgia 0.027776264 0.061642033 -0.02704 0.005448545 -0.060399206
Hawaii 0.046132322 0.032354111 -0.01207 0.000208239 0.006628343
Idaho 0.034279147 0.079518207 -0.01065 0.001415409 0.012508867
Illinois 0.026181733 -0.00423466 -0.02686 0.009395552 -0.074965339
Indiana 0.029363346 -0.018052372 -0.03619 0.003278711 -0.082730458
Iowa 0.03742408 0.030102792 -0.02003 0.013302284 -0.070715055
Kansas 0.035205041 0.024535741 -0.01711 0.010737476 -0.055073504
Kentucky 0.033931179 0.004954495 -0.02368 0.004716005 -0.071918014
Louisiana 0.051461517 0.010716371 -0.01095 0.00211614 -0.051527003
Maine 0.031649572 0.076965764 -0.04538 0.001340024 0.014404602
Maryland 0.045378723 -0.056463334 -0.03859 0.002294288 0.021014726
Massachusetts 0.029375883 0.051224048 -0.01854 0.00166173 -0.010496382
Michigan 0.008557732 -0.075498187 -0.02847 0.002053903 -0.059155775
Minnesota 0.032051359 -0.084210512 -0.02279 0.011827421 -0.043219792
Mississippi 0.033953913 0.055033777 -0.01347 0.001897296 -0.075704885
Missouri 0.028687696 0.053004425 -0.01458 0.005339538 -0.050379981
Montana 0.049780277 0.060569477 -0.01644 0.009846002 -0.044813521
Nebraska 0.043401236 0.040860578 -0.02286 0.01631667 -0.076675731
Nevada 0.042303439 0.452529031 -0.0187 0.003031383 -0.045645643
New Hampshire 0.032684991 -0.162890143 -0.05096 0.003258643 -0.091793201
New Jersey 0.029029761 -0.047035393 -0.02401 0.000925504 -0.082372833
New Mexico 0.038193737 0.021115696 -0.01065 0.001621029 -0.056002132
New York 0.03467023 -0.065479489 -0.01741 0.001389723 -0.037083996
North Carolina 0.039049975 0.059261206 -0.0037 0.000490773 -0.019984587
North Dakota 0.06320362 0.01088721 -0.01808 0.008056074 -0.055771341
Ohio 0.021439466 0.183930291 -0.03173 0.002213868 -0.073642432
Oklahoma 0.046693011 0.043173809 -0.0147 0.009701512 -0.05349348
Oregon 0.044942864 0.104558151 -0.02723 0.002402956 -0.095042527
Pennsylvania 0.033066892 -0.02957164 -0.02919 0.001223878 -0.024341673
Rhode Island 0.033313076 -0.022760279 0 0.000917831 0.016214664
South Carolina 0.032096772 0.031237315 -0.02036 0.00231007 -0.124326596
South Dakota 0.047385587 0.469062197 -0.01849 0.0080452 -0.055604383
Tennessee 0.030211452 0.00236595 -0.01019 0.002467995 -0.082291174
Texas 0.047094297 0.059320984 -0.02011 0.008697828 -0.083884567
Utah 0.048266405 0.10324304 -0.00499 0.0013787 0.000373107
Vermont 0.034301318 -0.06372458 -0.06107 0.00310232 -1
Virginia 0.042216644 0.195948105 -0.02854 0.002252882 -0.057116553
Washington 0.038229475 0.079556718 -0.0187 0.002366647 -0.063452806
West Virginia 0.041160928 0.034983031 -0.01392 0.002536552 -0.078224174
Wisconsin 0.030959512 0.051540749 -0.02368 0.006308962 -0.071700101
Wyoming 0.079619386 0.003836303 -0.02711 0.013704429 -0.128584078
Table A2 - Compound Annual Growth Rates
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State State GDP Bank Deposits Banks Branches Per Offices Unit Banks Per Offices
Alabama 0.464401966 0.321070217 -0.139240506 0.023241481 -0.315226337
Alaska 0.955777514 -0.193132586 -0.333333333 0.015606557 0
Arizona 0.496267489 -0.626651746 -0.133333333 0.021700318 -0.688180208
Arkansas 0.534386711 1.09937623 -0.32972973 0.08357947 -0.725791434
California 0.428153236 0.254998944 -0.174342105 0.03032036 -0.19443038
Colorado 0.448076891 0.055676883 -0.408839779 0.112798702 -0.668314429
Connecticut 0.392077607 6.061528449 -0.043478261 0.02099767 -0.486618705
Delaware 0.380593613 5.675920918 -0.363636364 0.073634859 -0.557915058
Florida 0.489988543 0.755452989 -0.169811321 0.0234911 -0.68188614
Georgia 0.351712785 0.93089721 -0.26035503 0.061593746 -0.49606198
Hawaii 0.642301258 0.419435315 -0.125 0.002293018 0.075376884
Idaho 0.448823407 1.32022279 -0.111111111 0.015680155 0.146534653
Illinois 0.328822816 -0.045607409 -0.258790436 0.108345731 -0.575636458
Indiana 0.374851196 -0.181588773 -0.333333333 0.036662922 -0.613217603
Iowa 0.498026752 0.385754208 -0.199535963 0.156456333 -0.553688668
Kansas 0.463154404 0.305564251 -0.17287234 0.124662087 -0.463736427
Kentucky 0.443470632 0.055869793 -0.231759657 0.053116766 -0.560002939
Louisiana 0.736709596 0.124403793 -0.11409396 0.023525401 -0.441176471
Maine 0.408815833 1.26058516 -0.4 0.014839424 0.17037037
Maryland 0.629334384 -0.472349204 -0.351351351 0.025528681 0.25704859
Massachusetts 0.375035399 0.732399949 -0.186046512 0.01843166 -0.109587489
Michigan 0.098268162 -0.578317634 -0.272189349 0.022826388 -0.488677434
Minnesota 0.414863072 -0.620027476 -0.224032587 0.138075031 -0.384916595
Mississippi 0.4438198 0.802727162 -0.138613861 0.021069377 -0.579353544
Missouri 0.364957087 0.764948999 -0.149171271 0.060328394 -0.433697507
Montana 0.706406507 0.909547056 -0.166666667 0.113798573 -0.396093326
Nebraska 0.595749857 0.553524698 -0.224637681 0.19486692 -0.584188249
Nevada 0.57737836 59.72577028 -0.1875 0.033855248 -0.401855288
New Hampshire 0.424447717 -0.858548677 -0.4375 0.036434852 -0.65323741
New Jersey 0.36995811 -0.411367165 -0.234567901 0.010227791 -0.611555577
New Mexico 0.510297318 0.258416692 -0.111111111 0.01797655 -0.469505178
New York 0.454860951 -0.525236616 -0.175675676 0.015393617 -0.340108624
North Carolina 0.52405556 0.883795424 -0.04 0.005411772 -0.199130106
North Dakota 0.962370074 0.126496174 -0.181818182 0.092274007 -0.468076772
Ohio 0.262812801 5.406007653 -0.298578199 0.024623916 -0.568912736
Oklahoma 0.6520096 0.591928007 -0.15034965 0.112046817 -0.453789919
Oregon 0.621877276 1.985894319 -0.261904762 0.026752396 -0.66664277
Pennsylvania 0.430253033 -0.281216204 -0.278074866 0.013545343 -0.237437733
Rhode Island 0.434006685 -0.22373104 0 0.010142607 0.193548387
South Carolina 0.41554806 0.402635464 -0.202531646 0.02570632 -0.767852637
South Dakota 0.664073581 67.77680798 -0.18556701 0.092144412 -0.467041257
Tennessee 0.387362998 0.026335517 -0.106598985 0.027485438 -0.611175166
Texas 0.658989876 0.884965167 -0.200282087 0.099947465 -0.618537201
Utah 0.679532247 1.947020527 -0.053571429 0.015270673 0.004111842
Vermont 0.44916507 -0.515337024 -0.5 0.03465982 -1
Virginia 0.575934085 6.158725092 -0.272727273 0.025062746 -0.476353596
Washington 0.510869293 1.321133434 -0.1875 0.026343372 -0.513787257
West Virginia 0.55846295 0.45970644 -0.142857143 0.028258648 -0.591794872
Wisconsin 0.398484665 0.738149691 -0.231746032 0.071629707 -0.558865185
Wyoming 1.322616024 0.043018172 -0.260869565 0.161514898 -0.77997076
Table A3 - 11-Year Growth Rate (2000-2010)
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0380766**
(0.013)
Offices Log 0.402812***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0145308***
(0.000)
Population Log 0.6851535***
(0.000)
Constant 11.66506***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9331
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table B1 -
Regression of State GDP on Deposits and Offices
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0308956***
(0.008)
Branches Log 0.5418656***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Log -0.1379699***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0061011***
(0.009)
Population Log 0.6248693***
(0.000)
Constant 12.22094***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9356
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table B2 -
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Regression of State GDP on Branches and Unit Banks
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Per Office Log 0.0330969***
(0.005)
Branches Log 0.5699838***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Log -0.1363223***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0060466***
(0.010)
Population Log 0.6253016***
(0.000)
Constant 12.19328***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.936
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table B3 -
Regression of State GDP on Deposits Per Office
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Per Capita 0.0308956***
(0.008)
Branches Log 0.5418656***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Log -0.1379699***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0061011***
(0.009)
Population Log 0.6557649***
(0.000)
Constant 12.22094***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9356
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Regression of State GDP on Deposits Per Capita
Table B4 -
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Share of State GDP 0.007959***
(0.000)
Branches Log 0.5689024***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Log -0.1358097***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0062608***
(0.007)
Population Log 0.6302198***
(0.000)
Constant 12.70164***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9332
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Regression of State GDP on Deposits Per State GDP
Table B5-
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0337274***
(0.009)
Branches Per Office 4.134844***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate  -0.0045819***
(0.004)
Failed Banks -0.0023382*
(0.062)
Population Log 0.9884759***
(0.000)
Constant 6.259391***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9185
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table C1 -
Regression of State GDP on Branches Per Office
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Per Capita 0.0337274***
(0.009)
Branches Per Office 4.134844***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0045819***
(0.004)
Failed Banks -0.0023382*
(0.062)
Population Log  1.022203***
(0.000)
Constant 6.259391***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9185 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table C2 -
Regression of State GDP on Weight of Deposits & Branches
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0236123*
(0.070)
Branches Per 100,000 Residents 0.020294***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Per 100,000 Residents -0.0881815***
(0.001)
Fed Funds Rate  -0.00761***
(0.001)
Population Log 1.052273***
(0.000)
Constant 8.809177***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9354
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table C3 -
State GDP on Branches Per 100,000 Residents
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0531638***
(0.000)
Banks Log -0.3107647***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0077762***
(0.000)
Population Log 1.28112***
(0.000)
Constant 6.462778***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9310
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table D1 -
Regression of State GDP on Banking Institutions
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0517972***
(0.002)
Banks With Branches Log -0.2363368***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0114348***
(0.000)
Population Log 1.23311***
(0.000)
Constant 6.831968***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9512
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table D2 -
Regression of State GDP on Banks With Branches
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0515294***
(0.001)
Banks With Branches Per Total Banks 0.699074***
(0.005)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0123901***
(0.000)
Population Log 1.043129***
(0.000)
Constant 8.195262***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9557
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table D3 -
State GDP on Banks With Branches Per Total Banks
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Log 0.0466053***
(0.008)
Fed Funds Rate  -0.0070294**
(0.035)
Unemployment Rate 0.0142168***
(0.004)
Population Log  1.052115***
(0.000)
Constant 8.619838***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9602
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table E1 -
State GDP on Deposits and Unemployment
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Per Office Log 0.0363904**
(0.048)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0068104**
(0.038)
Unemployment Rate 0.0152026***
(0.002)
Population Log  1.093733***
(0.000)
Constant 8.489432***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9615
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table E2 -
State GDP on Deposits Per Office and Unemployment
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Deposits Per Capita Log 0.0466053***
(0.008)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0070294**
(0.035)
Unemployment Rate 0.0142168***
(0.004)
Population Log  1.098721***
(0.000)
Constant 8.619838***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9602
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
State GDP on Deposits Per Capita and Unemployment
Table E3 -
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Banks With Branches Per Total Banks 0.6543091***
(0.009)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0048612*
(0.080)
Unemployment Rate 0.0141749***
(0.001)
Population Log 1.085487***
(0.000)
Constant 8.755773***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9533
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table E4 -
GDP on Banks With Branches Per Total Banks and Unemployment
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Offices Log 1.144823***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.0233734**
(0.020)
Financial Svcs Per State GDP 8.534381*
(0.074)
Constant 16.04489***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.5222
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Regression of Deposits on Offices
Table F1 -
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Branches Log 1.12504***
(0.000)
Fed Funds Rate -0.019585**
(0.045)
Financial Svcs Per State GDP 8.842435*
(0.060)
Constant 16.27683***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.5303
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table F2 -
Regression of Deposits on Branches
53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Estimated Parameter
Branches Log 0.3689651***
(0.001)
Unit Banks Log -0.0911513***
(0.009)
Population Log 0.8860582***
(0.000)
Constant 7.266605***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.7676
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table G1 -
Financial Svcs on Branches and Unit Banks
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Branches Per 100,000 Residents 0.0150061***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Per 100,000 Residents -0.0619785*
(0.057)
Population Log 1.176897***
(0.000)
Constant 4.79976***
(0.003)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.7668
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Financial Svcs on Branches Per 100,000 Residents
Table G2 -
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Branches Log 0.2528897***
(0.009)
Unit Banks Log -0.0727728***
(0.001)
Population Log 0.8178397***
(0.000)
Constant 8.777996***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9237 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table G3 -
Construction on Branches and Unit Banks
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Branches Log 0.4684415***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Log -0.09703***
(0.000)
Population Log 0.7119141***
(0.000)
Constant 9.924611***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.9646
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Table G4 -
Trade on Branches and Unit Banks
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Variable Estimated Parameter
Branches Log 0.7519366***
(0.000)
Unit Banks Log -0.1277685***
(0.000)
Population Log 0.5237414***
(0.003)
Constant 9.518039***
(0.000)
Observations 550
R-Squared 0.8227
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Transportation on Branches and Unit Banks
Table G5 -
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